we held firmly to our stand: no processions of workers or soldiers in the center of the city!

Suddenly a report came in that an artillery regiment was moving toward the Marinsky Palace. We called the barracks and learned that the regiment had been ordered there by General Kornilov, Commander of the Petrograd Military District. The telephone rang again. The regiment had been stationed in front of the Marinsky Palace as a demonstration of the government's strength, its guns trained on the streets converging at the Plaza around the palace. The regimental committees reported that the soldiers had left their barracks in answer to a service call, without knowing they would be used for a political demonstration against the Soviet. If they learned the purpose of the operation, a riot would break out and the officers would be in imminent danger.

The Executive Committee was in session when I took Chkheidze a draft of an order to the garrison: "In these troubled days, no soldier should appear on the streets with arms. Each order to leave the barracks must come from the Executive Committee and must be in writing, on a form with the Soviet letterhead. It must carry the seal of the Executive Committee and be signed by at least two of the following five members of the Committee . . . Before executing any order, ask the Tauride Palace for its confirmation by telephone."

Chkheidze signed the order and five minutes later it was wired to all military units. At once we had General Kornilov on the telephone and informed him of the Committee's decision. The chairman of the Soldiers' Section said to him, "General, we do not wish to undermine your authority by ordering the regiment back to the barracks. Please give the order yourself." After a moment's hesitation he replied, "The order is under way."

A few days later Kornilov resigned his post. This humiliation left a deep scar on his political views: he became obsessed with an hysterical hatred of the Soviets.

The Committee's order had shown how strong the Soviet's authority was at that time. The tension in the streets began to subside. On the afternoon of May 5 the Provisional Government issued a declaration clarifying Miliukov's ill-fated memorandum. Although intentionally weak and vague, this was a concession to the Soviet and the Executive Committee decided to accept it.

That evening the Soviet convened again in the Naval School. Both worker and soldier deputies were elated by the outcome of the conflict and proud of themselves for the restraint they had shown in the crisis. Tseretelli, who reported for the Executive Committee, was the hero of the day. During his speech I drove with Dan to the plant of *Izvestia*. Fewer people were in the streets than in the afternoon, but